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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Australian wheat industry is notoriously inefficient.1  A sale of wheat 
between farmer and wholesaler can involve up to 27 parties,2 and it is quite 
common for a farmer to wait sixty days—sixty days!—between delivering the 
wheat and receiving payment.3  In December 2016, though, one farmer in New 
South Wales sold 24 tonnes of wheat to a wholesaler and was paid in minutes, 
rather than days or months.4  This streamlined sale was made possible because 
a technology coordinator called AgriDigital automated many of the 
transaction steps.5  The coordinator electronically linked many steps that are 
traditionally performed by individual actors: The wheat was weighed 
electronically at delivery, with the weight then automatically input to calculate 
payment according to a pre-agreed-upon price, which in turn automatically 
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 1.   You knew that, right?  See Michael Bacina, When Two Worlds Collide: Smart Contracts 
and the Australian Legal System, 21 NO. 8 J. INTERNET L. 1, 19 (2018).   
 2.   Id. 
 3.   Katherine Davison, Blockchain Technology: Leading the Way to Shorter Payment Terms in 
Agriculture, AGRIDIGITAL (May 24, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://blog.agridigital.io/blog/blockchain-
technology-eading-the-way-to-shorter-payment-terms-in-agriculture [https://perma.cc/E2BJ-UHQJ]. 
 4.   James Eyers, Wheat Farmers Trial Blockchain to Sell Grain and Find It is Fast and Reliable, 
FIN. REV. (Dec. 21, 2016, 11:00 PM), https://www.afr.com/technology/wheat-farmers-trial-
blockchain-to-sell-grain-and-find-it-is-fast-and-reliable-20161206-gt57lx [https://perma.cc/6J8G-
NZVQ]; Gregor Heard, Blockchains a Glimpse of Future Payment System, QUEENSLAND  
COUNTRY LIFE (Dec. 14, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.queenslandcountrylife.com.au 
/story/4355255/blockchains-a-glimpse-of-future-payment-system/?cs=4733 [https://perma.cc/3FWR-
EVP5]. 
 5.   See Solving for Supply Chain Inefficiencies and Risks with Blockchain in Agriculture,  
CBH GRP. & AGRIDIGITAL 2–3 (Nov. 2017), https://assets.website-files.com/ 
5acb6c048451816da066ad80/5af2a0068f5865bb84d047ff_AgriDigital%20CBH%20Blockchain%20
White%20Paper%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ANW-FDFH]. 
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triggered the release of funds from buyer to seller.6  In fact, as the payment 
was transferred to the farmer, title of the grain was digitally transferred to the 
buyer simultaneously.7  This streamlined transaction utilized distributed 
ledger technology, which allowed the execution of the sale and payment to 
take place with the involvement of only 9 parties, instead of 27.8 
In this instance, the parties had agreed ahead of time to all the terms of 
the contract, and that agreement was then coded into computer-readable 
language.9  Once the performance of the contract (the delivery of the wheat) 
was electronically verified, the computer-coded contract then automatically 
triggered payment from the buyer to the seller, reducing the number of players 
and thus the opportunities for delay and error.10  The distributed ledger 
technology upgraded an old-fashioned transaction with modern technology, 
making the transaction significantly more efficient and secure. 
This transaction, automated by computer coding, is an example of a smart 
contract.  Although there is no one agreed-upon definition, all descriptions of 
smart contracts seem to agree that a smart contract is an agreement 
incorporating automated performance.11  A vending machine is a classic 
example of a smart contract:12 it’s standing there, offering a soda or a candy 
 
 6.   Id. at 3. 
 7.   Id. 
 8.   Bacina, supra note 1, at 19. 
 9.   See Solving for Supply Chain Inefficiencies and Risks with Blockchain in Agriculture, supra 
note 5, at 3. 
 10.   Id.  at 4.  According to the CEO of the technology coordination firm, AgriDigital, its 
platform has accommodated over $2 billion in transactions between the firm’s founding in 2016 and 
the end of 2019.  Emma Weston (@emmamweston), TWITTER (Dec. 26, 2019, 5:34 PM), 
https://twitter.com/emmamweston/status/1210343160351641600 [https://perma.cc/Q98U-GPBF].  
AgriDigital expanded to the United States in August, 2019.  Katherine Davison, AgriDigital Launches 
in United States as the North American Grain Harvest Gets Underway, AGRIDIGITAL (Aug. 30, 2019, 
4:50 PM), https://blog.agridigital.io/blog/agridigital-launches-in-united-states-as-the-north-american-
grain-harvest-gets-underway [https://perma.cc/6K9E-KR7K]. 
 11.   See, e.g., J.G. Allen, Wrapped and Stacked: “Smart Contracts” and the Interaction of 
Natural and Formal Language, 14 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 307 (manuscript at 3), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3297425 (“a single instrument, written in formal 
language, embodying both the contract as such and its automated mechanism of performance”); Helen 
Eenmaa-Dimitrieva & Maria José Schmidt-Kessen, Smart Contracts: Reducing Risks in Economic 
Exchange with No-Party Trust?, 10 EUR. J. RISK REG. 245, 245 (“self-executing agreements based on 
blockchain technology”); Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 305, 309 (2017) (“A smart contract is an agreement whose execution is automated.”). 
 12.   Many sources use this example.  E.g., NICK SZABO, THE IDEA OF SMART CONTRACTS 
(1997), https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOT 
winterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/idea.html [https://perma.cc/C2G8-Y99H]; Raskin, supra note 
11, at 314–16 (including delightful historical examples of vending machines, including a holy water 
dispenser developed in 215 B.C. and a “book-dispensing machine” invented in the 17th century to 
evade laws prohibiting people from selling offensive material); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, 
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bar for a specific price, and when someone accepts the offer by putting in the 
money, the machine automatically delivers the treat without needing any 
additional input or verification. 
A vending machine is a mechanical example of a smart contract, but smart 
contracts are becoming increasingly digitized.  For example, starter 
interrupters in leased cars have been around for over a decade: If a lessee fails 
to make a payment on a leased vehicle that is equipped with an internet-
enabled starter interrupter, the lessor can electronically (and remotely) instruct 
the starter interrupter to prohibit the vehicle from starting.13 
Increasingly, smart contract innovation is focused on the intersection with 
another technological breakthrough, distributed ledger technology.  A 
distributed ledger is an electronic form of recordkeeping that’s being 
maintained not by a single computer (or server or company or government), 
but instead is being maintained on a number of computers all networked 
together.14  When a new entry to the ledger is proposed, the computers in the 
network all work independently to verify the transaction.  Once a majority of 
the network verifies the transaction, the requisite consensus is reached and the 
ledger entry is added.15  Distributed ledger technology only works forward, 
though: New transactions are added to the ledger, but previous entries are not 
 
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 323–24 (2017); Jonathan G. Rohr, Smart Contracts and 
Traditional Contract Law, Or: The Law of the Vending Machine, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 77–78 
(2019); Tatiana Cutts, Smart Contracts and Consumers, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 396–97 (2019); Sai 
Agnikhotram & Antonios Kouroutakis, Doctrinal Challenges for the Legality of Smart Contracts: Lex 
Cryptographia or a New, ‘Smart’ Way to Contract?, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 300, 312 (2019); Mark 
Verstraete, The Stakes of Smart Contracts, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 743, 756–57 (2019). 
 13.   Christina M. Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 GA. L. 
REV. 1121, 1160 (2016).  This application was perhaps first theorized by Nick Szabo in 1997.  See 
Szabo, supra note 12.  As Szabo realized, and as experience has borne out, starter interrupters can 
inhibit use of a vehicle at crucial moments.  See How Auto Dealers Can Use GPS and “Starter 
Interrupter” Tech to Disable Your Car, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2017, 6:56 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/car-repossession-device-starter-interrupter-auto-dealer-car-credit-
city/ [https://perma.cc/Z5HH-UQEN]. 
 14.   Jesse Marks, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Corruption the Killer App?, 20 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 47 (2018). The first functional distributed ledger technology was  
the blockchain, upon which the Bitcoin system operates.  See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-
Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ23-RHTP].  
We thought Bitcoin was cool, but the blockchain technology underpinning it will likely eclipse  
Bitcoin itself in scope of innovation and utility.  See Jay Cassano, What Are Smart Contracts? 
Cryptocurrency’s Killer App, FAST CO. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
3035723/smart-contracts-could-be-cryptocurrencys-killer-app#:~:text=Smart%20contracts%20are% 
20computer%20programs,beyond%20simple%20transfers%20of%20funds [https://perma.cc/HCJ2-
HPZ5].  Another popular distributed ledger technology—capable of hosting transactional scripts—is 
Ethereum.  See What is Ethereum?,  ETHEREUM, ethereum.org/en/what-is-ethereum 
[https://perma.cc/S36D-NUF4] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 15.   See Marks, supra note 14, at 47. 
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changed.16  A transfer of funds from a wheat buyer to a wheat farmer cannot 
be reversed—the farmer would have to initiate a new transaction to send the 
funds back to the buyer.17 
Ledgers are not limited to tracking monetary transactions, though.  
Ledgers can track obligations and rights as well.  Accounting ledgers regularly 
track obligations like loan balances and accounts receivable, and a county’s 
deed records are a form of ledger tracking property rights and transfers.  
Distributed ledger technology innovators are currently pursuing a variety of 
applications, including location and ownership of commodities,18 real estate,19 
and health care.20 
A smart contract that utilizes distributed ledger technology as its 
operational platform should be referred to as a transactional script.21  Many 
writers tend to use the more general (and admittedly catchier) phrase “smart 
contract” when referring to transactional scripts,22 but it is time for this to 
 
 16.   Id.  
 17.   There have been exceptions to this truism that distributed ledgers only work forwards.  
Technology developers working on both Bitcoin and Ethereum have engineered “hard forks” that have 
the effect of reverting the distributed ledgers to earlier versions.  See Paul Vigna, Fund Based on 
Digital Currency Ethereum to Wind Down After Alleged Hack, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2016,  
7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investment-fund-based-on-digital-currency-to-wind-down-
after-alleged-hack-1466175033 [https://perma.cc/NQ67-4SGF]; Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Rival Ethereum 
Gains Traction, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2016, 11:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-rival-
ether-gains-traction-1466461279 [https://perma.cc/YA67-B9G5].  Doing so is extremely 
controversial for users, however, since one of the hallmarks of distributed ledger technology is that 
prior entries are immutable.  Thibault Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The 
Blockchain Antitrust Paradox, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 281, 330–31 (2019).  Protocols can also be 
designed to allow for reversals. 
 18.   E.g., Katherine Davison, Why Is Proof of Location Important for Digital Assets?, 
AGRIDIGITAL (Jan. 8, 2019, 3:27 PM), https://blog.agridigital.io/blog/why-is-proof-of-location-
important-for-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/4KWK-FYYG] [hereinafter  Davison, Why Is Proof of 
Location Important for Digital Assets?] (discussing expansion of the wheat contracting transactional 
script to “the oil and gas industry, [to] the metals industry, but also [to] very niche industries like the 
Pearl Industry, the Tapioca Industry of Thailand.”). 
 19.   E.g., Blockchain in Commercial Real Estate, DELOITTE 10 (2017), https:// 
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-dcfs-blockchain-incre-
the-future-is-here.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q33U-HZ32]. 
 20.   Blockchain: Opportunities for Healthcare, DELOITTE (2016), https:// 
www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/public-sector/articles/blockchain-opportunities-for-health-care.html 
[https://perma.cc/79NU-EQLL]. 
 21.   See Shaanan Cohney & David A. Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks, 105 
MINN. L. REV. 319, 323 (2020) (“A transactional script is a persistent piece of software residing on a 
public blockchain. When executed as a part of an exchange, the code effectuates a consensus change 
to the state of a ledger.”) 
 22.   E.g., @iang_fc, TWITTER (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:24 AM), 
https://twitter.com/iang_fc/status/1222450430413807616 [https://perma.cc/DD7C-DYCR] 
(“Nobody’s been happy with the term ‘smart contracts.’ B[e]c[ause] of the strong influence of Nick 
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change.23 
Back to our primary example: The Australian wheat transactional script 
example discussed here was a carefully controlled pilot transaction.24  The 
seller and buyer knew each other, and a local technology coordination firm 
worked closely with the parties to design and oversee the transaction.25  The 
parties agreed to the terms of the transaction in advance, the coordination firm 
coded the agreement onto a private distributed ledger managed and monitored 
by firm employees.  Had anything gone wrong with the transaction—had the 
scale malfunctioned and not correctly weighed the delivery or had a bug in 
the coding prevented payment—the parties no doubt would have worked 
together offline to rectify any errors in execution.  The transactional script did 
not change anything about the fundamental nature of the transaction between 
buyer and seller; it merely provided a technological upgrade that streamlined 
the execution of the agreement by automating steps that would otherwise have 
been performed manually. 
The wheat transaction is a current example of a transactional script smart 
contract, but this Article addresses the next generation, those in which a few 
contractual knowns become unknowns.  For example, whereas in the 
Australian wheat example, the parties knew each other IRL26 , it is not difficult 
to imagine that a next-generation transactional script may be between two 
parties who have not verified one another’s identities.  Or, whereas the arrival 
of the wheat and its weight were verifiable, quantifiable events, parties may 
in the future wish to apply transactional script technology to more qualitative 
agreements.  It is also entirely possible—perhaps even inevitable27—that 
transactional script code will contain a bug or a typo—resulting in, for 
example, payment directed to a stranger to the contract, leaving a seller 
without compensation and a buyer without incentive to pay again. 
In other words, this Article explores the implications of transactional 
scripts used in situations where there is less than total trust between the parties.  
 
[Szabo]’s writings, and the closeness of the idea in Bitcoin script, the term stuck. It’s also good copy 
material, makes readers feel smart.”).  
 23.   See infra Part II.A. 
 24.   Solving for Supply Chain Inefficiencies and Risks with Blockchain in Agriculture, supra note 
5, at 2–3. 
 25.   See id.  The technology coordination firm, AgriDigital, specializes in agricultural 
transactions.  See AGRIDIGITAL, www.agridigital.io [https://perma.cc/Z3H5-H9BZ] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2021). 
 26.   “In real life,” for the uninitiated.  
 27.   See Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 21, at 320–21 (“Even carefully audited, well tested 
software will (almost always) contain bugs. Therefore, and despite our best efforts . . . [s]mart 
contracts will (almost always) contain bugs!”) 
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In particular, this Article asks the question of how parties to these next-
generation transactional scripts can seek redress and remedies in the event that 
the transactional script does not perform according to the parties’ intent.28  
Until parties feel safe that any errors can be corrected, large-scale 
implementation of transactional scripts will be hobbled.29 
Part II of this Article articulates why the term “transactional scripts” is 
preferable to “smart contracts” and describes the utility and potential of 
transactional scripts.  Part III identifies several factors that hinder greater 
expansion of the use of transactional scripts. It goes on to identify uncertainty 
of enforcement30 as the most important barrier to transactional script 
innovation, finding that parties will be reluctant to entrust bigger and more 
complex transactions to transactional scripts until the parties are comfortable 
that an external mechanism is capable of correcting errors in the execution of 
the transaction.  This lack of reliable enforcement mechanisms is a problem 
exacerbated by the characteristic of distributed ledger technology, which is to 
move only forward, preventing revisions or reversals of preexisting entries.31  
Part IV explores and critiques possible mechanisms that may be able to 
provide error correction, including statutory law, private law, online dispute 
resolution, public/private regulatory partnership, and common law.  Part V 
concludes the Article, noting that the expansion of transactional scripts’ utility 
will be tethered to the security provided by available error-correction 
mechanisms.  Only as contracting parties become assured that the integrity of 
their transactional intent will be effectuated will transactional scripts be 
adopted for use. 
 
 28.   This Article aims to address situations in which both or all parties’ intent is not met (both 
parties are unhappy with the transactional script’s execution), as well as situations in which one or less 
than all parties’ intent is not met (at least one party is satisfied but the other(s) is/are not). 
 29.   See Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and 
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 157–58 (2016) (noting that 
contracts are only entered into if the parties have a combination of trust in one another’s performance 
and reliable external enforcement mechanisms from which to seek redress in the event of breach). 
 30.   Some sources refer to smart contracts as being “self-enforcing,” meaning that once 
programmed, the smart contract will execute without further human involvement.  E.g., Kyung Taeck 
Minn, Towards Enhanced Oversight of “Self-Governing” Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: 
Case Study of the DAO and Its Shortcomings, 9 N.Y.U J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 139, 146 (2019) 
(“The smart contract, in addition to its self-executing and irreversible properties, is also self-enforcing 
because withholding payment when the relevant condition is satisfied is not possible if the smart 
contract code does not allow for it.”).  That is not the meaning intended here.  Rather, “enforcement” 
as used in this Article refers to the ability of the parties to seek correction of erroneous performance, 
so that the parties’ intent for the contract will be enforced. 
 31.   KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 101 (2018). 
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II. TRANSACTIONAL SCRIPTS: A NEW WAY FORWARD 
This Part articulates why the term “transactional scripts” is a better 
descriptor than “smart contracts,” and goes on to explore current and potential 
applications for transactional scripts. 
A. Terminology 
A “smart contract” is any agreement that incorporates automated 
performance.32  Those that do so via distributed ledger technology deserve 
their own specific term, because the term “smart contract” implies that the 
agreement can do more than it actually can.33  In one sense a contract is a set 
of if-thens—if dollar, then soda—and the fact that a contract is recorded via 
computer code does not revolutionize the underlying agreement.  The 
adjective “smart,” on the other hand, implies a technology that does more than 
its human operators recognize: a “smart” watch with features the user can 
discover and upgrade over time; a “smart” television that can algorithmically 
recognize a viewer’s entertainment preferences and recommend new shows 
to watch.  A “smart” contract doesn’t do any of this.  “Smart” contracts are 
merely pre-arranged agreements that respond to certain stimuli in pre-
determined ways, changing the state of some electronic asset upon receipt of 
a pre-determined input.34  They do not innovate, or adapt, or problem-solve; 
they merely wait for inputs and respond upon receipt.35 
“Transactional script” is a better descriptor for these specific smart 
contracts.36  It’s a better descriptor, first and foremost, because it’s a boring 
phrase and will discourage flights of fancy about sentient computers and 
contracts.37  Instead, “transactional” refers to the transactive nature of the 
agreement—if delivery, then payment—and which captures the sense of 
movement (of money, or goods, or ownership) only upon the input of a 
catalytic event.  “Scripts” here refers merely to the computer code by which 
the pre-arranged contract is reduced to a form of writing.  As a whole, the term 
 
 32.   SZABO, supra note 12. 
 33.   E.g., @iang_fc, supra note 22.  
 34.   See Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 21, at 322–23. 
 35.   See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application 
Platform, ETHEREUM (2013),  https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/ [https://perma.cc/7LGD-4SJN]. 
 36.   See Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 21, at 323. 
 37.   Vitalik Buterin, founder and chief developer of the Ethereum blockchain, tweeted in 2018, 
“To be clear, at this point I quite regret adopting the term ‘smart contracts.’  I should have called them 
something more boring and technical, perhaps something like ‘persistent scripts.’”  @VitalikButerin, 
TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2018, 12:21 PM), https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/1051160932699770882 
[https://perma.cc/AJJ3-MB6Q].  
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“transactional scripts” conveys the sense that the computer code waits 
passively for input, upon receipt of which it will automatically change some 
state to which it has access. 
The Australian wheat transaction described above, therefore, is best 
described as a transactional script rather than a “smart contract,” because its 
terms were encoded on, and its automated performance facilitated by, a 
distributed ledger technology.38  This Article will use the more specific term 
“transactional script” instead of the more general “smart contract,” even as 
many of the quotations and sources cited herein use the term “smart 
contract.”39  (This Article will also generally use the term “distributed ledger 
technology” rather than “blockchain,” as a blockchain is a kind of distributed 
ledger technology.40) 
B. Utility 
Many people find transactional scripts appealing for philosophical 
reasons, that the distributed technology heralds a libertarian utopia where 
autonomous individuals can transact between each other without state 
oversight or authorization.41  Others are concerned that transactional scripts 
may enable (purposefully or by accident) transactions that would be 
unenforceable or illegal if they were attempted via lower-tech methods.42  
Because distributed ledger technology is pseudonymous, there may be no way 
to ensure the contracting parties’ capacity or intent to enter into the agreement, 
such as contracts entered into by minors.  Because transactional scripts 
automatically execute after the code is made live, and because the results of 
 
 38.   The transaction was recorded on and effectuated by a private blockchain, in turn facilitated 
by the Ethereum platform. Heard, supra note 4. 
 39.   E.g., Raskin, supra note 11, at 306. 
 40.   Several identifiable features are among the hallmarks of blockchain and distributed ledger 
technology: the distributed structure, the consensus mechanism, and the immutability of 
recordkeeping.  Schrepel, supra note 17, at 330–31.  Other hallmark features are that transactions are 
conducted peer-to-peer (because the network records the transactions but does not act as a central 
processor), and that users on the network are pseudonymous (meaning each user is identified by a 
specific but anonymized key, akin to an account number).  Id.  
 41.   See Dmitri Kosten, Bitcoin Mission Statement, or What Does It Mean[,] Sharing Economy 
and Distributed Trust? (Oct. 31, 2015) (manuscript at 5, 13), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2684256 [https://perma.cc/MC8D-LFPE] (crediting technological 
advancements in the means of production with the transformation from feudalism to capitalism, and 
suggesting that distributed ledger technology and smart contracts are similarly “poised to disrupt the 
existing system [of financial control].”).   
 42.   Kolber refers to the technology’s ability to act as “artificial responsibility,” and warns in a 
subheading that “Artificial Responsibility Can Be Dangerous (Don’t Be Lulled by the Absence of 
Scary Robots).”  Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 
21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 231 (2018).   
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transactional scripts are tamper-resistant on the distributed ledger, there may 
be no way to undo the results of an agreement that would otherwise have been 
illegal or unenforceable.43 
Still others argue that transactional script technology eliminates valuable 
features of lower-tech contracting.44  The option of efficient breach may be 
eliminated in a transaction utilizing a transactional script, since a transactional 
script will automatically execute according to its terms.45  Traditional 
contracting also has in place ready mechanisms for consumer protection; 
moving contracting to decentralized digital platforms outside the current legal 
and business framework may well mean a lack of consumer protection for 
weaker parties.46 
Why bother developing transactional scripts, then?  In short, they are 
more efficient and secure.  Pre-programmed terms and automated execution 
can streamline routine transactions, speed performance and payment, and 
confirm origins and locations.47  Transactional scripts also allow parties to 
transact peer-to-peer around the globe, across international borders (which in 
turn raises potential compliance concerns.)   
As of this writing, transactional scripts’ utility is promising but largely 
 
 43.   See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 12, at 367–74 (identifying potential problems with 
mutual assent, consideration, capacity and legality); Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy & Rachel 
Wilka, Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 313, 326–36 (2018) (identifying potential problems with formation, allocation of risk, 
indemnification, flexibility, enforcement, state laws, third party intrusion, statute of frauds, regulatory 
compliance, and the unauthorized practice of law); Bacina, supra note 1, at 20–21 (identifying 
potential problems with requirements that contracts be in writing, notification of terms, identifying 
parties, illegality, enforcement, liability of the author); Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: 
“Smart” Contracts as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law 19–20 (Higher Sch. of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper, Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016),  https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885241 [https://perma.cc/8P4M-8TS8] (noting that invalid consent or 
intent does not impact a smart contract’s validity, along with the possibility of smart contracts for 
illegal purposes); Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 153–57 
(2017) (identifying problems with mutual assent, consideration, and defenses  
to formation); Contracts on the Blockchain, INST. INT’L FIN., GETTING SMART, 9 (May 2016), 
https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/32370132_smartcontracts_report_may_2016_vf.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/K5JX-LWBH] (identifying legal issues regarding jurisdiction, demonstrating acceptance 
of offers, whether coding smart contracts constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, and consumer 
protection, among other concerns).   
 44.   In addition to the examples noted in this paragraph, see infra Parts III.B. and C.   
 45.   Savelyev, supra note 43, at 15, 18.   
 46.   Id. at 19–20.   
 47.   See Sarah Jane Hughes, Do Blockchain Technologies Make Us Safer? Do Cryptocurrencies 
Necessarily Make Us Less Safe?, 55 TEX. INT’L L.J. 373, 388–89 (2020); Youngju Yun, The Influence 
of Blockchain Technology on Fraud and Fake Protection, OLD DOMINION U. UNDERGRAD. RSCH. J., 
2020, at 3–5, https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=ourj 
[https://perma.cc/PT94-83A8].   
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unrealized.48  Transactional scripts are currently quite simple, helpful “when 
you can ask quantitative questions like amounts, temperature, weight, time 
and date, and other measurable items.”49  They are also sensible for entities 
that conduct business with “trading partners who are also moving toward 
using smart contracts[,]” particularly if the entity “[e]xecutes a lot of simple 
contracts with those partners[.]”50  In short, transactional scripts are useful for 
agreements that are “low risk and high volume[.]”51   
Because transactional scripts are helpful for automated, quantitative 
transactions,52 much interest and attention is paid to their potential application 
in financial services.53  For example, as of this writing, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) is looking to automate standard 
transactions via transactional scripts.54  Standardized, automated agreements 
could significantly streamline transactions between contracting parties.55  
Moreover, any time an industry uses standardized contracts, the regulatory 
burden is lightened, and a self-executing standardized script could further 
simplify regulatory efforts.56   
After financial services, the next phase of adopters will likely be systems 
and industries that require public recordkeeping, such as real estate 
 
 48.   An amusing number of articles for practitioners assure lawyers that “[s]mart contracts won’t 
steal your job.”  Dan Puterbaugh, The Future of Contracts: Automation, Blockchain, and Smart 
Contracts, 34 NO. 10 ACC DOCKET 48, 51 (2016).  See also Judah A. Druck, “Smart Contracts” are 
Neither Smart nor Contracts. Discuss, 37 NO. 10 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 5, 5 (2018) 
(“smart contracts (in their current form) provide few practical benefits, and will do little to remove 
lawyers from anything but the simplest of transactions.”); Susan George, Smart Contracts: Tools for 
Transactional Lawyers,  ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm? 
Section=articles&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=39994 [https://perma.cc/9A8Y-
BQRN] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (“Smart contracts will not make lawyers obsolete, but we will 
increasingly need to help clients analyze whether and how a smart contract makes sense in a particular 
transaction.”); Dennis Kennedy, Thinking Smartly About Smart Contracts, 44 NO. 1 LAW PRAC. 56, 
59 (2018) (encouraging lawyers to familiarize themselves with smart contract technology).  But see 
generally Michael Guihot, New Technology, the Death of the BigLaw Monopoly, and the Evolution of 
the Computer Professional, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 405 (2019).   
 49.   Joshua Bernstein, Smart Contract Integration in Professional Sports Management: The 
Imminence of Athlete Representation, 14 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 88, 92 (2018).   
 50.   Puterbaugh, supra note 48, at 51.   
 51.   Id. at 50.   
 52.   Id. at 51.   
 53.   Bernstein, supra note 49, at 92.   
 54.   Stéphane Blemus, Law and Blockchain: A Legal Perspective on Current Regulatory Trends 
Worldwide, CORP. FIN. & CAP. MKTS. L. REV., Dec. 2017 (manuscript at 14), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080639 [https://perma.cc/N4ZX-YPK9].   
 55.   Nicolette Kost De Sevres, Bart Chilton & Bradley Cohen, The Blockchain Revolution, Smart 
Contracts and Financial Transactions, 21 NO. 5 CYBERSPACE LAWYER NL 3 (2016).   
 56.   Id.  (“Smart contracts are potentially attractive to regulators, since they increase transaction 
security and reduce the risk of manipulation.”).   
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transactions57 and Article 9 secured transactions.58  If deeds, mortgages, and 
financing statement records can be moved to distributed ledger technology 
systems, the distributed recordkeeping could ensure title ownership accuracy 
and eliminate the need for title searches.59  Furthermore, if the purchase of 
property and the related title transfer was connected to the financing 
transaction, transactional scripts could streamline repossession or foreclosure 
in the event of nonpayment: failure to make loan payments could be 
programmed to trigger transfer of the asset’s title to the lender or secured 
party—with appropriate due process protections programmed in, of course.60   
Other, nonpublic recordkeeping may also benefit from distributed ledger 
technology, and transactional scripts may one day be able to automate 
payments between parties upon the occurrence of triggering events.  For 
example, a life insurance contract may be coded via a transactional script to 
make a payment to beneficiaries upon verification of the policy-holder’s 
death.61  Or a transactional script for household utilities could track, say, 
energy use and pre-authorize appropriate payment amounts based on the 
relevant utility rate.62  Other applications being explored include anti-money 
laundering regimes,63 derivatives trading,64 copyright regimes,65 the 
 
 57.   See McKinney et al., supra note 43, at 344.  See also Edward D. Baker, Trustless Property 
Systems and Anarchy: How Trustless Transfer Technology Will Shape the Future of Property 
Exchange, 45 SW. L. REV. 351, 356–57 (2015).   
 58.   See Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 402–03 (2017).  
Professor Reyes has written a functional, Article 9-compliant recording system entirely utilizing 
transactional scripts.   
 59.   See Josias N. Dewey & Michael D. Emerson, Beyond Bitcoin: How Distributed Ledger 
Technology Has Evolved to Overcome Impediments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 UCC 
L.J. 105, 119–20 (2017); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 808–09 (2015).  
 60.   See Cassano, supra note 14.   
 61.   Alan Cohn, Travis West & Chelsea Parker, Smart After All: Blockchain, Smart  
Contracts, Parametric Insurance, and Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 273, 281 (2017); 
Michael Abramowicz, Blockchain-Based Insurance, in BLOCKCHAIN AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 OF A NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 1, 2 (GW Legal Stud. Rsch.  
Paper No. 2019-12) (Ioannis Lianos et al. eds., forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3366603 [https://perma.cc/8B4N-F5ME]; see also Michael 
Abramowicz, Cryptoinsurance, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 704 (2015).   
 62.   Id. at 299–300; see Claire Henly, Sam Hartnett, Sam Mardell, Buck Endemann, Ben 
Tejblum & Daniel S. Cohen, Energizing the Future with Blockchain, 39 ENERGY L.J. 197, 213 (2018). 
 63.   Reyes, supra note 58, at 403–04. 
 64.   Massimo Morini, Managing Derivatives on a Blockchain. A Financial Market Professional 
Implementation (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3075540 [https:// 
perma.cc/BX8J-BC84]. 
 65.   Nick Vogel, The Great Decentralization: How Web 3.0 Will Weaken Copyrights, 15 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 136, 142 (2015). 
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healthcare industry,66 athletic contracts between teams and players,67 
managing payments for music downloads,68 energy trading platforms,69 and 
the issuance of securities.70  Even before these myriad applications become 
fully operational, transacting parties will likely find ways to incorporate 
transactional scripts as smaller parts of a larger transaction.71  Overall, “[t]he 
open question is no longer whether [transactional scripts] will become 
ubiquitous but whether and when they can be programmed to execute ever 
more complex tasks on blockchain platforms.”72 
Of course, with new technology comes new potential for errors and 
unintended consequences.  Take, for example, a typical life insurance 
contract, where, upon receiving proof of death, a set amount of insurance 
policy proceeds will be disbursed to beneficiaries.  Now imagine the same life 
insurance contract with a technological upgrade, encoded as a transactional 
script: A computer-coded “oracle” is programmed to scour the Internet 
continually until it finds evidence of the policy-holder’s death, perhaps by 
finding an obituary online or by interpreting a loved one’s Facebook post.73  
The oracle then delivers this information as proof of death to the transactional 
script that records the life insurance contract, and the transactional script 
causes funds to be released from the insurance company’s bank account and 
deposited into the account(s) of the beneficiary(s).   
The potential errors in this scenario fairly leap off the page.  What if the 
deceased isn’t the policy holder, but is instead another person with the same 
name?  What if the notice of a person’s death is an error or a hoax?74  What if 
 
 66.   Tsui S. Ng, Blockchain and Beyond: Smart Contracts, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/09/09_ng/ [https://perma.cc 
/N6BP-7DY9]. 
 67.   See Bernstein, supra note 49, at 92–93.  
 68.   McKinney et al., supra note 43, at 342.  
 69.   Joseph Lee & Vere Marie Khan, Blockchain and Smart Contract for Peer-to-Peer Energy 
Trading Platform: Legal Obstacles and Regulatory Solutions, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3556260 [https://perma.cc/9YEQ-DHYT]. 
 70.   See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, 
and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets 4–5 (Cardozo Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 527), 
(Univ. of Tenn. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 338, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104 [https://perma.cc/FS6F-AGE4]. 
 71.   See Puterbaugh, supra note 48, at 51. 
 72.   Craig A. de Ridder, Mercedes K. Tunstall & Nathalie Prescott, Recognition of Smart 
Contracts in the United States, 29 NO. 11 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 17, 19 (2017). 
 73.   See Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: 
Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 
208–09 (2014). 
 74.   See, e.g., Tom Kington, Twitter Hoaxer Comes Clean and Says: I Did It to Expose Weak 
Media, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
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there’s a typo in the code, and the wrong amount gets disbursed?  What if the 
beneficiaries have closed their accounts, or no longer have access to them?  
What if the typo is in the beneficiaries’ account numbers, and the proceeds 
get accidentally disbursed to third parties?  Or what if the decedent passed 
away without leaving an online trace, and the death isn’t recognized in the 
first place? 
Some of these errors would be easy to correct—If the wrong dollar 
amount is disbursed, for example, the insurance company and the 
beneficiaries can likely work that out.  Other errors are trickier, such as the 
funds being accidentally disbursed to third parties, who may not be 
identifiable at all, or may not be within a local court’s jurisdiction.75   
It is concerns over these kinds of errors, as well as errors we cannot yet 
anticipate, that hinder risk-taking in the development and adoption of 
transactional scripts.  This and other barriers to adoption are explored in the 
Part below.   
III. BARRIERS TO ADOPTION 
The previous Part sketched the current state of transactional scripts, which 
is that they are hypothetically useful but not practically useful—yet.76  Several 
important problems pose significant barriers to broader adoption of 
transactional scripts.77 
A. Technological literacy and incentive 
For starters, many people don’t know that smart contracts or transactional 
scripts exist.  Even among those who have heard the terms, many do not fully 
understand how the technology works or have the technological literacy to 
enter into one.   
Furthermore, some have suggested that actors in traditional contracting 
scenarios are specifically disincentivized to facilitate transactional script 
development: “transaction-facilitating intermediaries like lawyers, banks, 
payment processors, commercial courts, and governments are sure to resist 
 
2012/mar/30/twitter-hoaxer-tommaso-de-benedetti [https://perma.cc/DL5Q-XLLF]; Jordan Sargent, 
Cormac McCarthy Isn’t Dead, but an Old Prankster Tricked USA Today into Reporting He Was, 
GAWKER (June 28, 2016), https://gawker.com/cormac-mccarthy-isnt-dead-but-an-old-prankster-
tricked-1782747839 [https://perma.cc/BXU7-CNJU]. 
 75.   See Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, 73 BUS. LAW. 
109, 112–13 (2018). 
 76.   See Ng, supra note 66 (noting issues of “scalability, centralization risk, and usability”). 
 77.   See id. No doubt more barriers and potential barriers exist than those discussed here.  
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the self-executing contract revolution every step of the way.”78  This quotation 
may overstate the concern, but there is a certain lack of logic to developing 
technological literacy that will in turn take away part of your business model.   
B. Translating contracts into code 
Although a contract is conceptually a series of if-then statements (if 
performance, then payment; if breach, then remedies/damages), the reality of 
expressing language in computer code is that the translation is imperfect.79  In 
one sense, the problem is one of semantics: the terminology used by lawyers, 
clients, and regulators differs from that of computer programmers, with a 
plausible result being that neither side understands exactly what the other 
thinks the contract is performing.80  In another sense, the disconnect may be 
differences in the understanding of what a contract actually is, and what it is 
promising: “Law professionals define a contract as a formal legally binding 
agreement between parties, while computer engineers perceive it as computer 
code.”81   
It is important here to distinguish the code from the agreement: the 
agreement being the parties’ intentions, desires, and promises, whereas the 
code is merely the manifestation of that agreement.82  It may be impossible 
for any set of words or media to perfectly capture the parties’ agreement.83   
Coding natural-language contracts presents difficulties, given the 
syntactic and semantic richness of language.84  Traditional contracts may even 
have a useful component of storytelling that itself helps further a client’s 
 
 78.   McKinney et al., supra note 43, at 347. 
 79.   Charlotte R. Young, Note, A Lawyer’s Divorce: Will Decentralized Ledgers and Smart 
Contracts Succeed in Cutting out the Middleman?, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 649, 657–58 (2018). 
 80.   See Tom Butler, Firas Al Khalil, Marcello Ceci & Leona O’Brien, Smart Contracts and 
Distributed Ledger Technologies in Financial Services: Keeping Lawyers in the Loop, 36 NO. 9 
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 1 (2017) (“[M]ore attention should be paid to bridging the 
yawning gap between a smart contract’s legal semantics, business semantics and regulatory semantics 
and its denotational semantics and ensuring provenance, while guaranteeing the empirical fidelity of 
a contract’s operational semantics.”) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 81.   Blemus, supra note 54, at 13.  See also Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in 
Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 607 (2015) (“[T]he task of encoding the legal 
subtleties and nuances that underlie even the most basic contract poses significant programming 
challenges.”). 
 82.   See Kolber, supra note 42, at 220–21 (giving as an example The DAO’s problematic code, 
which did not reflect the parties’ actual agreement). 
 83.   See id. at 219. 
 84.   Allen, supra note 11, at 21–25. 
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goals.85   
Many people are working to develop transactional script protocols and 
best practices that will marry lawyers’ intentions with computer programming 
realities,86 but some skeptics have suggested that the more readable a contract 
is to humans, the less it is to computers—and vice versa.87  On the other hand, 
one company claims to have developed a machine-readable English 
programming language, Lexon.88   
This difficulty becomes significantly more complex in the context of 
international transactions, where parties from different legal systems may 
themselves have different understandings of what constitutes a contract.89  If 
the parties themselves struggle to articulate the nature of their promises and 
obligations to each other, programming such promises in computer code will 
likely be even more difficult.   
C. Inflexibility 
One of the ideals of distributed ledger technology overall is its certainty: 
a truly decentralized,90 immutable91 system means that transactions cannot be 
unwound.92  Yet this very feature is also a transactional script’s Achilles’ heel: 
 
 85.   Susan M. Chesler & Karen J. Sneddon, Once Upon a Transaction: Narrative Techniques 
and Drafting, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 263, 295 (2016). 
 86.   See e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. CLACK, VIKRAM A. BAKSHI, & LEE BRAINE, SMART CONTRACT 
TEMPLATES: FOUNDATIONS, DESIGN LANDSCAPE AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS, 1 (2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf; see also CHRISTOPHER D. CLACK, VIKRAM A. BAKSHI, & LEE 
BRAINE, SMART CONTRACT TEMPLATES: ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN OPTIONS, 1 (2016), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.04496.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SV9-QPTE]. 
 87.   James Hazard & Helena Haapio, Wise Contracts: Smart Contracts that Work for People and 
Machines, in TRENDS AND COMMUNITIES OF LEGAL INFORMATICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INFORMATICS SYMPOSIUM IRIS 2017 4 fig.1 (Erich Schweighofer et al.  
eds., 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925871.  But see LEXON, 
http://lexon.tech/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (purporting to provide a computer coding language that 
is “human readable like natural language.”). 
 88.   See LEXON, supra note 87. 
 89.   I am grateful to Rita Christopher for this insight. 
 90.   For an analysis of whether blockchain technology is truly decentralized, see Michele 
Benedetto Neitz, The Influencers: Facebook’s Libra, Public Blockchains, and the Ethical 
Considerations of Centralization, 21 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 41, 48–49 (2019); Angela Walch, 
Deconstructing “Decentralization”: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems, in CRYPTO ASSETS: 
LEGAL & MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (Chris Brummer ed., 2019). 
 91.   For a discussion of the use of the term “immutable” with regard to distributed ledger 
technology, see Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 713, 735–45 (2017). 
 92.   See Schrepel, supra note 17, at 328–31 (identifying five “key characteristics” of blockchain 
technology, including pseudonymity, distributed architecture, peer-to-peer transmission, consensus 
blockchain validation, and data immutability). 
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once programmed, the transactional script will execute exactly as written, 
bugs and all.  Any ability to modify or terminate a transactional script must 
be programmed into it from the outset.   
This certainty of performance creates “debilitating inflexibility”93 that 
would-be transactional script-ers are understandably wary of: “[W]e know 
today that firms consider contractual flexibility to be a crucial strategic 
issue.”94  Lawyers and their clients rely on not only a written contract’s 
“linguistic ambiguity,” but also its “enforcement discretion.”95  If contracting 
parties are in fact counting on the malleability of language and the ability to 
choose among remedies, an imperfectly-programmed (or even a perfectly-
programmed) transactional script cripples both these strategic advantages.   
D. Enforcement 
Assuming the technological literacy to enter into a transactional script 
smart contract is present,96 the most significant barrier to adoption of the 
technology is the uncertainty of how to undo or remedy the real-world results 
of a transactional script gone wrong.  Until parties are confident that the 
contractual intent will be carried out by the transactional script or enforced by 
some external error-correction mechanism, parties will be slow to adopt this 
new technology.  And given that the technology has the potential for 
significant economic advantages,97 sluggish innovation and implementation 
would be a shame. 
Transactional scripts will have pre-programmed performance and 
execution, but in some situations, the performance and execution undertaken 
by the transactional script will not be that which the parties intended.  
Mistakes are inevitable.  A lost geotag may show that delivery has not 
occurred when in fact it has.98  The parties will need to confirm receipt and 
send payment even though the transactional script will not recognize that 
delivery has occurred.  A typo in a real estate transaction script may transfer 
title of a property for less than the intended purchase price or may 
 
 93.   Druck, supra note 48, at 7. 
 94.   Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 
302 (2017). 
 95.   See id. at 264.  
 96.   See supra Part III.A. 
 97.   See supra Part II.B. 
 98.   See Katherine Davison, Why Is Proof of Location Important for Digital Assets?, supra note 
18.  (“We integrate with the scale or the weighbridge and when the truck delivering that green crosses 
over the weighbridge, we then create a digital asset in our system and that digital asset can be recorded 
on a chain as well, and that then becomes the asset itself.”). 
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unintentionally transfer title to another party.  If the transfer is for less than 
the intended purchase price, the seller could seek the remaining balance owed 
from the buyer, in court if necessary.  If, however, title was transferred to 
another party, the buyer and seller would need to track down that third party 
in order to have title to the property transferred back.  The third party has no 
economic incentive to do so, and if that third party is unidentifiable, or in a 
jurisdiction outside the reach of US courts, title to the property may be 
unrecoverable.99 
In these situations, and particularly in situations where the error has 
caused conflict, parties may need to turn to some kind of enforcement 
structure outside the transactional script, such as relying on statutes, courts, or 
alternative dispute resolution techniques to ensure the parties’ contractual 
intent is met.  Of course, this seeking of outside enforcement is diametrically 
opposed to the libertarian ideal of distributed ledger technology: parties 
dealing directly with one another, without intermediaries (especially 
governmental ones).100  Moreover, the efficacy of all available enforcement 
mechanisms is suspect at best.101  Without reliable enforcement mechanisms, 
parties must be prepared to “absorb[] the inherent risks of an automated 
contract”102 or simply avoid using transactional scripts until the enforcement 
mechanisms are reliable.103  Part IV analyzes the available enforcement 
mechanisms, critiquing each. 
IV. POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ARE ALL IMPERFECT 
The previous Part identified a few barriers to widespread adoption of 
transactional scripts, including the difficulty of translating contracts into code, 
the inflexibility of transactional scripts’ performance and execution, and the 
uncertainty of enforcement mechanisms available in situations where a 
 
 99.   Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 75, at 112–13.  This hypothetical assumes that legal title to 
real property is recorded on a blockchain via a token or “colored coin” system.  See Steve Walters, 
What are Colored Coins? The Ultimate Guide, UNBLOCK (Apr. 27, 2018), https://unblock.net/what-
are-colored-coins/ [https://perma.cc/YY9Q-34TB].  Even if legal title to the property was transferred 
to an unresponsive third party, the physical nature of the property would be unchanged—this may, 
however, turn the buyer into a squatter.  
 100.   See Schrepel, supra note 17, at 328–29. 
 101.   See infra Part IV. 
 102.   McKinney et al., supra note 43, at 345.  Parties are more likely to absorb risks if those risks 
are low.  See id at 328.  See also Victor Li, Bitcoin’s Useful Backbone Blockchain Technology Gains 
Use in Business, Finance and Contracts, ABA J., Mar. 2016, at 31 (“Would you buy a house based 
on a smart contract?  Probably not.  But would you buy something on Amazon where you’d agree to 
release money only after the delivery drone crosses a certain point?  Maybe.”). 
 103.   See Christopher, supra note 29, at 161–66 (conceptualizing how parties rely on a 
combination of trust and reliable enforcement mechanisms when entering into contracts). 
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transactional script’s execution is misaligned with the parties’ actual intent.  
This Part analyzes available enforcement mechanisms in more detail.104  
Again, as used in this Article, “enforcement” does not mean ensuring the 
performance of the contract as it is written—transactional scripts are self-
enforcing in that regard.  Rather, the term “enforcement” means ensuring that 
the contract is performed according to the parties’ intent, and that where 
performance does not align with parties’ intent, the errors in execution can be 
unwound and corrected.105 
So far, most legal standards about distributed ledger technology and 
transactional scripts have come in the form of “soft law” rather than “hard 
law”—guidance memoranda, position papers, and the like, as opposed to 
statutes and court rulings.106  This may be because the technology is so new 
that likely problems are not understood well enough to legislate appropriate 
solutions,107 because regulators remain siloed from one another despite 
blockchain technology disrupting multiple sectors simultaneously,108 or 
because there has been no significant blockchain litigation that required 
development of relevant, decisive common law doctrine.  Early signs from 
“hard law” sources are not encouraging, as will be discussed below. 
A. Statutory Law 
As has often been the case throughout American legal history, the 
development of transformative technologies leads almost immediately to cries 
from legal experts that the new technology must be regulated in order to keep 
 
 104.   Allen et al. introduced the term “dispute resolution possibility frontier,” or DRPF.  Darcy 
W. E. Allen, Aaron M. Lane & Marta Poblet, The Governance of Blockchain Dispute Resolution, 25 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 75 (2019). 
 105.   See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 12, at 318 (asserting that the role of contract law is as a 
“remedial institution”). 
 106.   See Blemus, supra note 54.  The fact that U.S. regulators are issuing “mostly non-binding” 
“positions” on fintech issues appears to be influencing regulators worldwide, such as those in the 
European Union, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore.  Id. 
 107.   As a general principle, statutes and regulations dealing with developing technology should 
not be passed until the technology and its related issues are fully understood.  See, e.g., Tracy Hresko 
Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 71 
(2017) (critiquing state legislatures’ passage of laws regulating nascent driverless car technology as 
overregulating relatively safe autonomous systems and underregulating more dangerous 
semiautonomous systems). 
 108.   See Saule T. Omarova, Technology v. Technocracy: Fintech as a Regulatory Challenge 
(Cornell Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 20-14, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3545468 [https://perma.cc/8BGR-B32K].  
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the public safe.109  Numerous pieces of legal scholarship examining the 
nascent technology of transactional scripts have already called for 
governmental regulation;110 however, these articles seem unclear on what 
exactly should be regulated or what those regulations would accomplish.  
Should the government be regulating distributed ledger technology itself, or 
the appropriate uses for the technology, or who can use it and under what 
circumstances?  The literature has reached no consensus on these issues.  This 
Subpart analyzes legislative efforts at both the federal and state levels.  
(Although one exciting attribute of transactional scripts is their ability to cross 
borders, this Subpart addresses U.S. law only.) 
1. Federal Legislation 
Federal legislation may not be conceptually appropriate for transactional 
scripts, given that they are in essence a technological upgrade of contracts, 
traditionally an area of state law authority.  On the other hand, given the ease 
with which transactional scripts can cross state and national boundaries, and 
the speed with which technological innovations are being pursued, a coherent 
national legal framework may be beneficial.  For example, Congress passed 
the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (“E-SIGN”) law 
in 2000, which broadly authorized the validity of electronic signatures on 
contracts.111  A similar federal law could address the legality, enforceability, 
and error-correction mechanisms applicable to transactional scripts.  Such a 
federal law could resolve the burgeoning state law patchwork described 
below.112  The difficulty here would be that the technology is so new, and its 
innovative potential so significant, that national legislation can only be 
reactionary; proscriptive legislation is unlikely to correctly diagnose, let alone 
appropriately resolve, potential legal problems. 
One additional concern about transactional scripts is the consumer 
 
 109.   See Tracy Hresko Pearl, Hands Off the Wheel: The Role of Law in the Coming Extinction of 
Human-Driven Vehicles (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3400945 
[https://perma.cc/3PL8-GUWC] (comparing the legal landscapes of the turn of the 20th century, when 
American society transitioned from horse to automobile transportation, to the modern nascent 
transition from human-driven to autonomous vehicles). 
 110.   E.g., Phillip Paech, The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks, 80 MOD. L. REV. 
1073, 1076–77 (2017) (“[B]lockchain financial networks cannot remain outside the regulatory 
perimeter.”); Brito et al., supra note 73, at 221. 
 111.   Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 
464 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 7001–7031. 
 112.   See infra Part IV.A.2.  Of note, the federal E-SIGN legislation is expressly preempted by 
state Uniform Electronic Transaction Act laws.  15 U.S.C. § 7002(a). 
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protection issues posed when contracting on a new technological platform.113  
Just as E-SIGN contains requirements regarding consumer protection 
issues,114 federal law on transactional scripts could clarify consumer 
protection requirements and norms.  Unfortunately, a more detailed discussion 
of the consumer protection issues in transactional script smart contracting is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
2. State Legislation 
Despite utter lack of clarity regarding what problems exist or how 
government can appropriately address them, state legislatures are taking up 
distributed ledger technology legislation left and right, “resulting in a 
regulatory mishmash” that might well be making things worse instead of 
better.115 
Some state blockchain (or distributed ledger technology) laws are being 
passed for quite specific purposes.  For example, a small number of states 
have passed laws that authorize distributed ledger technology use in corporate 
recordkeeping.116  Vermont has passed a law regarding the evidentiary 
admissibility of records stored on distributed ledger technologies,117 while 
Arizona has specifically prohibited the use of distributed ledger technology to 
track firearm ownership.118  A few states have passed laws that simply direct 
state agencies to explore or foster blockchain or distributed ledger technology 
 
 113.   See, e.g., Danielle D’Onfro, Smart Contracts and the Illusion of Automated Enforcement, 
61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173 (2020); Randall Duran & Paul Robert Griffin, Smart Contracts: A 
Catalyst of the Next Global Financial Crisis?, J. FIN. REG. COMPLIANCE (2019), 
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6106&context=sis_research [https:// 
perma.cc/BZ7R-S24P] (considering potential systemic risks as well as consumer protection issues 
such as lack of transparency and misuse). 
 114.   15 U.S.C. § 7001(c). 
 115.   Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger 
Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 211 (2016). 
 116.   E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 204(a)(12)(A), 2603(a)(12)(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 372 
of 2020 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 224 (West, Westlaw through ch. 292 of the 150th Gen. 
Assemb.); S.B. 1859, 2019 Leg. (Tex. 2019); H.B. 185, 2019 Leg. (Wyo. 2019).  Vermont law even 
authorizes “blockchain-based limited liability companies,” or BBLLCs, “a business that utilizes 
blockchain technology for a material portion of its business activities . . . .”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 
4172 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1-159, 161-169, 171-179, M-1-M-12 of the Adjourned Sess. of 
the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb.).  Laws are pending in additional states.  For continuously updating 
information, see Paul Hodnefield, Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Laws: State-by-State Adoption, 
Corporation Service Company, with Practical Law Finance, THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L., (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2020).  
 117.   VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1913 (West. Westlaw through Acts 1-159, 161-169, 171-179, M-
1-M-12 of the Adjourned Sess. of the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb.). 
 118.   ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3122 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg.). 
2021] ERROR CORRECTION MECHANISMS 513 
   
 
use.119  This may be partially to encourage cost-saving technological 
development and partially a legislature’s desire to signal to distributed ledger 
technology investors that the state is amenable to business development.120 
As of this writing, the most common state statutory addition regarding 
blockchain and distributed ledger technology is to states’ Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Acts.121  UETA is designed “to remove barriers to electronic 
commerce by validating and effectuating electronic records and 
signatures.”122  States that have amended their UETA statutes have generally 
done so to specifically include blockchain or distributed ledger technology in 
existing electronic records laws.  But even where multiple states appear to be 
passing similar laws all with similar purposes, minor differences in the passed 
legislation may make for industry and legal confusion. 
Several states have passed amendments to confirm that signatures and 
records on a distributed ledger are “electronic” signatures and records—as if 
there was any doubt.  Arkansas law, for instance, specifies that “A signature 
that is secured through blockchain technology shall be considered to be in 
electronic form and an electronic signature” and likewise, “[a] record or 
contract that is secured through blockchain technology shall be considered to 
be in electronic form and an electronic record.”123  Arizona,124 North 
 
 119.   E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11546.9(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) 
(directing the Government Operations Agency to appoint a blockchain working group to report on the 
risks and benefits of blockchain use by state government and California businesses); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-37.5-105(13)–(14), 24-33.5-1904, 22-33.5-1905 (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess.); S.B. 213, 2019 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019); H.B. 70, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).  
Laws are pending in additional states.  For continuously updating information, see Hodnefield, supra 
note 116. 
 120.   See infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 121.   Promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission, UETA has been adopted in every U.S. state 
except New York and Illinois.  Electronic Transactions Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=2c04b76c-2b7d-4399-
977e-d5876ba7e034 [https://perma.cc/L52F-XJY3] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
 122.   Prefatory Note of UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 1999), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile. 
ashx?DocumentFileKey=2c38eebd-69af-aafc-ddc3-b3d292bf805a&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
PX2F-PSRQ].  For example, “[i]f a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies 
the law.”  UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7(c) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1999). 
 123.   ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(b)–(c) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 First Extraordinary 
Sess. & the 2020 Fiscal Sess. of the 92nd Ark. Gen. Assemb. and changes made by the Ark. Code 
Revision Comm’n received through Dec. 15, 2020).  
 124.   ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(A)–(B) (West, Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 
54th Leg. (2020)). 
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Dakota,125 Ohio,126 and Oklahoma127 laws contain substantively identical 
language, and statutes in South Dakota128 and Washington129 aren’t far off.  
But Tennessee uses different terminology in an attempt to accomplish the 
same thing: “A cryptographic signature that is generated and stored through 
distributed ledger technology is considered to be in an electronic form and to 
be an electronic signature[;]” and “A record or contract that is secured through 
distributed ledger technology is considered to be in an electronic form and to 
be an electronic record.”130 
What to make of one state using the terms “cryptographic” and 
“distributed ledger technology,” while seven other states use the term 
“blockchain technology,” while 42 other states’ laws contain no references to 
any of these words? 
Even among the seven states that use the term “blockchain technology,” 
definitions differ.  For example, Arizona defines “blockchain technology” as 
“distributed ledger technology that uses a distributed, decentralized, shared 
and replicated ledger, which may be public or private, permissioned or 
permissionless, or driven by tokenized crypto economics or tokenless.  The 
data on the ledger is protected with cryptography, is immutable and auditable 
and provides an uncensored truth.”131  North Dakota’s definition is 
 
 125.   N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-16-19(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 66th 
Legis. Assemb.). 
 126.   OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1306.01(G)–(H) (West, Westlaw through Files 78, 80 through 81, 
83 through 92, 94, 103 through 104, 106 through 107, 109 and 112 through 113 of the 133rd Gen. 
Assemb. (2019-2020)). 
 127.   OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 15-102(9)–(10) (West, Westlaw with enacted legis. of the 2d Reg. 
Sess. of the 57th Legis. (2020)). 
 128.   “‘Electronic record,’ a record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored 
by electronic means.  The term includes a record that is secured through blockchain technology;” and 
“‘Electronic signature,’ an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated 
with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.  The term includes 
a signature that is secured through blockchain technology.”  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-12-1(8)–(9) 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess. L., Exec. Order 20-31 and Sup. Ct. Rule 20-06). 
 129.   “‘Electronic’ means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, 
optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities, including without limitation blockchain and 
distributed ledger technology.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1.80.010 (7) (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Legis.). 
 130.   TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-202(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 
Extraordinary Sess. of the 111th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.). 
 131.   ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(E)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 54th 
Leg. (2020).  This definition is similar to Arkansas’ definition of “blockchain distributed ledger 
technology.”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 1st Extraordinary 
Sess. and the 2020 Fiscal Sess. of the 92nd Ark. Gen. Assemb. and changes made by the Ark. Code 
Revision Comm’n received through Dec. 15, 2020). 
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substantively identical.132  South Dakota defines the term “blockchain 
technology” similarly, with the notable omission of the phrase “uncensored 
truth.”133  Tennessee uses definitional language identical to South Dakota’s, 
but the term defined under Tennessee law is “distributed ledger technology,” 
not “blockchain.”134 
Washington defines “blockchain” simply: “a cryptographically secured, 
chronological, and decentralized consensus ledger or consensus database 
maintained via internet, peer-to-peer network, or other similar interaction;”135 
while Nevada has the lengthiest definition: 
1. “Blockchain” means an electronic record of transactions or other data 
which is: (a) Uniformly ordered; (b) Processed using a decentralized 
method by which one or more computers or machines verify the recorded 
transactions or other data; (c) Redundantly maintained by one or more 
computers or machines to guarantee the consistency or nonrepudiation 
of the recorded transactions or other data; and (d) Validated by the use 
of cryptography. 
2. The term includes, without limitation, a public blockchain.136 
Curiously, Arkansas statutes define both “blockchain technology” and 
“blockchain distributed ledger technology,”137 but only the term “blockchain 
 
 132.   See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-16-19(5)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 66th 
Legis. Assemb.).  
 133.   S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-12-1(8)–(9) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 66th 
Legis. Assemb.) (“‘Blockchain technology,’ technology that uses a distributed, shared, and replicated 
ledger, either public or private, with or without permission, or driven with or without tokenized crypto 
economics where the data on the ledger is protected with cryptography and is immutable and 
auditable.”). 
 134.   TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-201(1) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess. of 
the 11th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.) (“‘Distributed ledger technology’ means any distributed ledger protocol 
and supporting infrastructure, including blockchain, that uses a distributed, decentralized, shared, and 
replicated ledger, whether it be public or private, permissioned or permissionless, and which may 
include the use of electronic currencies or electronic tokens as a medium of electronic exchange[.]”). 
 135.   WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1.80.010 (3) (West, Westlaw with all Legis. from the 2020 Reg. 
Sess. of the Wash. Leg.). 
 136.   NEV. REV. STAT. § 719.045 (West, Westlaw through the end of both the 31st and 32nd Spec. 
Sess. (2020)).  There is a separate definition for “public blockchain,” which is identical to the 
definition of “blockchain” except that it adds a fifth element: “Does not restrict the ability of any 
computer or machine to: (a) View the network on which the record is maintained; or (b) Maintain or 
validate the state of the public blockchain.”  § 719.145(5) (West, Westlaw through 31st and 32nd Spec. 
Sess.). 
 137.   ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(a)(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 1st Extraordinary 
Sess. and the 2020 Fiscal Sess. of the 92nd Ark. Gen. Assemb. and changes made by the Ark. Code 
Revision Comm’n received through Dec. 15, 2020).  The two definitions are remarkably different.  
Compare § 25-32-122(a)(1) (“‘Blockchain distributed ledger technology’ means technology that uses 
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technology” is used in other portions of the law—the term “distributed ledger” 
does not appear anywhere else in Arkansas statutes. 
Among states that do define the term “distributed ledger technology,” 
definitions again vary.  Washington defines the term as “any distributed ledger 
protocol and supporting infrastructure, including blockchain, that uses a 
distributed, decentralized, shared, and replicated ledger[;]”138 while 
Tennessee defines it as “any distributed ledger protocol and supporting 
infrastructure, including blockchain, that uses a distributed, decentralized, 
shared, and replicated ledger, whether it be public or private, permissioned or 
permissionless, and which may include the use of electronic currencies or 
electronic tokens as a medium of electronic exchange[.]”139 
To further belabor this point, the few states that have to date statutorily 
defined “smart contract” have also done so inconsistently.  Arizona and North 
Dakota use substantively identical language,140 while Arkansas141 and 
Tennessee142 define the term differently. 
Why are these definitions and terminology so inconsistent?  One 
explanation is that there is no universally accepted definition of 
 
a distributed, decentralized, shared, and replicated ledger that is: (A) Either: (i) Public; or (ii) Private; 
(B) Either: (i) Permissioned; or (ii) Permissionless; and (C) Contains data that is: (i) Securely protected 
with cryptography; (ii) Immutable; (iii) Auditable; and (iv) Provides an uncensored truth[.]”), with § 
25-32-122(a)(2) (“‘Blockchain technology’ means a shared, immutable ledger that facilitates the 
process of recording one (1) or more transactions and tracking one (1) or more tangible or intangible 
assets in a business network”). 
 138.   WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1.80.010(6) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 139.   TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess. of the 
111th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.). 
 140.   “‘Smart contract’ means an event-driven program, with state, that runs on a distributed, 
decentralized, shared and replicated ledger and that can take custody over and instruct transfer of assets 
on that ledger.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(E)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 
the 54th Leg. (2020); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-16-19(5)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. 
of the 66th Legis. Assemb.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-16-19(5)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess. of the 66th Legis. Assemb.). 
 141.   “‘Smart contract’ means: (A) Business logic that runs on a blockchain; or (B) A software  
program that stores rules on a shared and replicated ledger and uses the stored rules for: (i) Negotiating 
the terms of a contract; (ii) Automatically verifying the contract; and (iii) Executing the terms of a 
contract.”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 1st Extraordinary 
Sess. & the 2020 Fiscal Sess. of the 92nd Ark. Gen. Assemb. and changes made by the Ark. Code 
Revision Comm’n received through Dec. 15, 2020). 
 142.   “‘Smart contract’ means an event-driven computer program, that executes on an electronic,  
distributed, decentralized, shared, and replicated ledger that is used to automate transactions, 
including, but not limited to, transactions that: (A) Take custody over and instruct transfer of assets 
on that ledger; (B) Create and distribute electronic assets; (C) Synchronize information; or (D) Manage 
identity and user access to software applications.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-201(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess. of the 111th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.). 
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“blockchain.”143  Another possible, and troubling, explanation for the 
differences in these statutes from state to state may be that legislators don’t 
understand the technology they purport to regulate.144  Either of these 
rationales should be enough to discourage legislatures from statutorily 
defining these terms—if definitions cannot be precise and accurate, they 
should not be codified.  It is for this reason that this Article makes the case for 
universal adoption of the term “transactional scripts” when describing smart 
contracts on distributed ledger technology;145 precise and consistent 
definitions will further effective expansion of the technology’s utility. 
Furthermore, legislatures passing laws regarding blockchain and 
distributed ledger technology should be mindful that uniformity and 
consistency are virtues when it comes to technology that spans state borders.  
Ironically, the state statutory amendments discussed above demonstrate states 
making inconsistent amendments to an otherwise uniform act.  Instead, “the 
varying definitions of blockchain and distributed ledger technology used by 
Arizona, Nevada, and Tennessee, and proposed by other states in amending 
their laws, may create unintended roadblocks.”146  By amending their states’ 
UETA laws to include blockchain definitions of questionable accuracy, states 
are “making a formerly universal law not so universal[.]”147 
Moreover, the wisdom of the UETA as it was originally written is that it 
defines electronic transactions conceptually rather than by specific 
technologies.148  As a result, the functional utility of transactional scripts is 
already within existing legal definitions of electronic transactions, and 
specific amendments to the laws are not necessary.149 
Troublingly, states may be passing laws not for their substantial 
 
 143.   A.J. Bosco, Blockchain and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 74 BUS. LAW. 243, 
243 (Winter, 2018–2019). 
 144.   Lucy Kelly, What is Enabled? How “Blockchain Enabling” Legislation Fails Commercial 
Contracts, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 19–24 (2019). 
 145.   See supra Part II.A. 
 146.   Bosco, supra note 143, at 248. 
 147.   Id. 
 148.   UNIF. L. COMM’N, GUIDANCE NOTE REGARDING THE RELATION BETWEEN THE UNIFORM 
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT AND FEDERAL ESIGN ACT, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY  
AND “SMART CONTRACTS” 4 (2019), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System  
/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d2026984-1040-3c6f-62c8-a676b12d7bff&force 
Dialog=0 [https://perma.cc/8BAA-GPNQ].  The Uniform Law Commission recommends against 
states amending their UETA statutes to include blockchain language, specifically because UETA’s 
technology-neutral framing already encompasses new technological developments such as distributed 
ledger technology.  Id. at 7. 
 149.   I disagree with scholars who suggest that UETA should be amended to include blockchain 
and smart contract terminology.  See, e.g., Jared Arcari, Note, Decoding Smart Contracts: Technology, 
Legitimacy, & Legislative Uniformity, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 363, 392 (2019). 
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regulation of distributed ledger technology and its uses, but merely to signal 
the state’s friendliness as a home for business development.150  Several states 
have passed laws explicitly preventing municipalities from regulating 
distributed ledger technology activity, meaning that regulation can occur at 
the state level only, which may also be intended to create the image of a state 
as a blockchain-development haven.151  Although it is possible that “those 
jurisdictions[] which have the most Blockchain-friendly regulations will have 
competitive advantage in attraction of new innovative business models and 
companies willing to exploit them in a legal way,”152 the opposite may also 
be borne out.  Passing blockchain or distributed ledger technology laws—
particularly inept ones that do not accurately define terms or demonstrate 
understanding of the technology—may scare off blockchain innovators: 
“Businesses that want to engage in commerce via blockchain may be better 
served in states that choose not to make a big splash in the blockchain pool.”153 
3. Policy Considerations 
Some scholars recommend that government not rush to regulate 
distributed ledger technology that is still in rapid development, with its 
ultimate uses unknown and even unimaginable.154  It seems wise that 
legislative and regulatory bodies resist the urge to pass rules governing 
distributed ledger technology.  It is not currently clear exactly what problems 
are truly likely to be experienced related to this technology, and the likelihood 
of governmental bodies correctly preventing problems that have not yet 
emerged seems small.155  Whether because they misunderstand the 
technology, define it imprecisely,156 or simply cannot predict its future 
applications, laws and regulations passed in haste are likely to stymie positive 
 
 150.   See Cohn et al., supra note 61, at 285 (asserting that Arizona’s blockchain law was passed 
for this purpose). 
 151.   E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-500.42, 11-269.22 (Westlaw through the Second Reg. 
Sess. of the Fifty-Fourth Legis. (2020)); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-37.5-407(3), (6) (West, 
Westlaw through all Legis. of the 2020 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 244.3535(1), 268.0979(1) 
(West, Westlaw through the end of both the 31st and 32nd Spec. Sess. (2020)).  Laws are pending in 
additional states.  For continuously updating information, see Hodnefield, supra note 116. 
 152.   Savelyev, supra note 43, at 2. 
 153.   Bosco, supra note 143, at 251. 
 154.   See, e.g., Morgan N. Temte, Comment, Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: 
Just How Smart Are Smart Contracts?, 19 WYO. L. REV. 87, 113–14 (2019). 
 155.   See Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 70–74 (2006) 
(describing mechanisms employed by public and private entities engaged in predictive 
decisionmaking.). 
 156.   See Angela Walch, Blockchain’s Treacherous Vocabulary: One More Challenge for 
Regulators, 21 NO. 2 J. INTERNET L. 1, 9 (2017). 
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technological development while simultaneously failing to prevent true future 
threats. 
Moreover, there is a mismatch between the speed of development of 
distributed ledger technology and legislation or regulation.  The technology is 
rapidly developing, while legislatures and regulatory agencies ought to be 
thoughtful and deliberative.  The worst scenario here would be laws that are 
quickly passed or regulations that are haphazardly promulgated which stifle 
innovation while failing to prevent abuses, but that are slow to be repealed or 
modified. 
Overall, the lack of national standards and the patchwork of state laws are 
not reassuring would-be transactional scripting parties that errors in 
transaction performance can be effectively corrected.  Though these laws and 
regulations attempt to protect users and foster development, they do not 
address the significant potential for transactional scripts to execute in ways 
counter to parties’ expectations, nor do they provide a sense of security that 
these errors can be corrected. 
B. Private Law/Code Is Law 
If legislators and regulators are unlikely to correctly diagnose, prevent, or 
resolve errors in transactional scripting, perhaps a laissez faire approach 
would be better: “If you don’t know what is best, let people make their own 
arrangements.”157  That is, let people enter into transactional scripts knowing 
that the performance of the contract is final, regardless of whether it’s the 
performance both parties intended—so long as both parties understand the 
risks, let them live with the results.158  Such an approach requires parties to 
trust not only each other, but the code itself to execute as they intended.159  
This kind of private law, where the parties govern their own transactions and 
disputes, may be “better positioned to be updated for encompassing the new 
factual patterns offered by [transactional script] technology.”160 
 
 157.   Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 
210 (1996). 
 158.   See Kolber, supra note 42, at 227 (“Voluntary Agreements Should Generally Be Supported, 
Even Hyperliteral Ones”) and 233 (“While it’s possible for us to craft hyperliteral agreements, I argue 
that we need to be very explicit about the fact that we’re doing so.”); Felipe Jiminez, A Formalist 
Theory of Contract Law Adjudication, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 1121, 1163 (2020). 
 159.   Jenny Cieplak & Simon Leefatt, Smart Contracts: A Smart Way to Automate Performance, 
1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 417, 427 (2017).  Parties must trust the coder, as well.  This raises potential 
issues of liability for the coder, as well as possibly constituting the unauthorized practice of law if the 
coder is “translating” a written contract to computer code.  See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 160.   Sai Agnikhortram & Antonios Kouroutakis, Doctrinal Challenges for the Legality of Smart 
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In many ways, this private-law approach comports with the libertarian 
ideals of cyberspace and distributed ledger technology: the idea of parties 
dealing directly with one another, without intermediation by government or 
other actors.161  “[T]here is regulation of behavior in cyberspace, but that 
regulation is imposed primarily through code” rather than government.162  
Indeed, in a purely free-market, online environment, “software may be seen 
as the sole determinant for enforceability, thus bypassing the relevant rules of 
private law and the authority of the courts.”163 
Code is law in the sense that software engages in behavioral gatekeeping, 
only recognizing and responding to certain user behavior.164  “[A]s opposed 
to traditional legal rules, which merely stipulate[] what people shall or shall 
not do, technical rules determine what people can or cannot do in the first 
place.”165  Point the wrong remote at a television and nothing will happen.  
The traditional form of law regulates behavior by enforcing conformity with 
a set of norms—commit a crime or a tort and face the consequences.  “The 
advantage of . . . regulation by code is that, instead of relying on ex-post 
enforcement by third parties (i.e., courts and police), rules are enforced ex-
ante, making it very difficult for people to breach them in the first place.”166 
There are several concerns with this private law approach to transactional 
script error-correction, most of which relate to consumer and market 
protection issues.  First, code-is-law protocols do not necessarily contain the 
 
Contracts: Lex Cryptographia or a New, ‘Smart’ Way to Contract?, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 300, 300 
(2019). 
 161.   See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); Nakamoto, 
supra note 12, at 1; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
951 (1984) (celebrating contract as exercise of individual autonomy).  But see LESSIG, supra, at 6 
(“The invisible hand [of cyberspace], through commerce, is constructing an architecture that perfects 
control—an architecture that makes possible highly efficient regulation.”). 
 162.   LESSIG, supra note 161, at 20; Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What is Law? A 
Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 473 (2012) 
(“legal order” does not require a nation-state enforcer, but exists where “(i) there is an identifiable 
entity (an institution) that deliberately supplies a normative classification scheme that designates some 
actions as ‘wrongful’ (punishable, undesirable) and (ii) actors, as a consequence of the classification 
scheme, forego wrongful actions to a significant extent.”). 
 163.   Paech, supra note 110, at 1076. 
 164.   See Baker, supra note 57, at 356 (distributed ledger technologies “provide a scaffold for the 
development of extralegal property systems that rely on software to maintain compliance, rather than 
the rule of law.”). 
 165.   Samer Hassan & Primavera De Filippi, The Expansion of Algorithmic Governance: From 
Code is Law to Law is Code, SPECIAL ISSUE 17, FIELD ACTIONS SCIENCE REPS. 88, 89 (2017), 
https://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/4518 [https://perma.cc/ZC24-HXLK]. 
 166.   Id. at 166 (emphasis in original). 
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transparency or consumer protection mechanisms of public law.167  Disparate 
levels of bargaining power or technological literacy between the parties may 
lead to weaker parties entering into unfair agreements, and once entered into, 
the transactional script technology will execute exactly as written.  Consumer 
protection principles mandate a mechanism by which unconscionable, illegal, 
and otherwise unenforceable contracts are rendered void or voidable.  
Transactional scripts, however, will provide this non-execution option only if 
programmed to do so from the outset.  Unscrupulous contracting parties 
seeking to prey on weaker parties have no incentive to include code that 
provides a non-performance option. 
Unfairness that results from contracting parties with unequal bargaining 
power may compound into systemic problems.  “We can build, or architect, 
or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental, or we 
can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to 
disappear.”168  For example, powerful private actors like Facebook and 
Google are already monitoring private action online, and “[w]ithout 
appropriate legal safeguards, it is plausible that the development of blockchain 
technology could . . . lead[] to increased surveillance.”169  It is important that 
“emerging autonomous systems [develop] in ways that promote economic 
growth, free speech, democratic institutions, and the protection of individual 
liberties.”170  Ensuring these ideals may require some form of oversight, which 
purely peer-to-peer transactions lack. 
Furthermore, a purely peer-to-peer, code-is-law system of governance 
risks adversely affecting third parties and the market as a whole: “[S]ince third 
parties and the market at large may also be affected [by transactional script 
contract performance errors], the issue of enforceability of rights cannot be 
left entirely to the software, even if the parties themselves agree to transact 
following the internal rules of the network.”171  An unpoliced network of 
privately contracting parties may even result in collusion that can warp the 
 
 167.   See Baker, supra note 57, at 361 (“Online, contract law is not the law of bargained-for 
exchange; it has become the law of company-dictated exchange.”); See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart 
Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 36, 42–43 
(2014). 
 168.   LESSIG, supra note 161, at 6. 
 169.   Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise 
of Lex Cryptographia, 1, 53 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664 
[https://perma.cc/2KNK-EXWA].  
 170.   Id. at 57–58; see also Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in 
Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1185–86 (2017) (analyzing how the design of online 
markets can perpetuate or alleviate discrimination). 
 171.   Paech, supra note 110, at 1076. 
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free function of markets.172 
C. Online Dispute Resolution 
Transactional scripts execute as written, for better or for worse, but one 
approach to mitigate errors in performance (that is, the transactional script 
performing other than as the parties intended) is to incorporate error-
correction or dispute-resolution mechanisms into the transactional scripts 
from the beginning.173  Provisions for online arbitration, crowd-sourced 
dispute resolution, or AI-powered solutions can be programmed into the 
transactional script at the time of formation.174 
These on-chain dispute resolution methods are known as “online dispute 
resolution,” or ODR, borrowing the term and the concept from the e-
commerce sector.175  Parties can incorporate private dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation176 or arbitration177 into the transactional 
script.178  These dispute resolution mechanisms should be designed such that 
any party can trigger them, and that the ODR mechanism will effectively 
pause the transaction until the dispute is resolved.179 
The benefits of building dispute resolution into the transactional script are 
that resolutions can be reached more quickly and efficiently than by 
 
 172.   See Dr. Thibault Schrepel, Collusion by Blockchain and Smart Contracts, 33 HARV. J.L. 
AND TECH. 117, 128, 130–31 (2019). 
 173.   Bridget A. Smith & Teresa L. Bechtold, When Smart Contracts Break: Developments in 
Blockchain, Smart Contracts, and Online Dispute Resolution, 36 COMPUT. & INTERNET LAW. 1, 2 
(2019). 
 174.   See Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Smart Contracts, 2019 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 103, 114–22 (2019). 
 175.   Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsch, Blockchain and the Inevitability of Disputes: The 
Role for Online Dispute Resolution, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 47, 57–58 (2019); see also Amy J. Schmitz, 
A Blueprint for Online Dispute Resolution System Design, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2–3 (2019), 
(describing best practices for designing e-commerce ODR mechanisms). 
 176.   James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin and Beyond: Current and Future Regulation of 
Virtual Currencies, 9.2 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429, 467–68 (2015), 
https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/78477/OSBLJ_V9N2_429.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
[https://perma.cc/M8C3-3SBZ].  
 177.   E.g., Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law 49–53 (George Washington U. L. 
Sch. Public L. Rsch. Paper No. 2015-9, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2573788 [https://perma.cc/W9HW-79UF] (describing peer-to-peer 
blockchain arbitration); Gatto & Broeker, supra note 176, at 467–68 (describing the use of smart 
oracles as adjudicators). 
 178.   For detailed case studies of specific ODR mechanisms and providers, see Allen et al., supra 
note 104, at 86–89. 
 179.   Schmitz & Rule, supra note 174, at 122–23.  Other recommendations from that article 
include the incorporation of time limits to prevent parties from using ODR as delay or hindrance 
tactics, and possibly requiring the maintenance of an escrow account.  Id. at 123.  
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litigation,180 as well as avoiding jurisdictional difficulties such as identifying 
parties and establishing territorial jurisdiction.181  ODR provisions can also 
preserve anonymity of the parties, if that is a desirable feature of the 
transactional script.182  ODR can also preserve parties’ relationships by 
avoiding more formal dispute resolution such as litigation, and, if the dispute 
resolution mechanism is incorporated into standardized transactional scripts, 
provides opportunity for “large-scale redress.”183 
On the other hand, private dispute resolution may not necessarily be fair 
to each of the contracting parties.  The more powerful party may be able to 
force an unfair dispute resolution mechanism on the less powerful.  Similarly, 
if parties have different levels of technological literacy, the more literate party 
may be able to incorporate an unfairly favorable ODR mechanism into the 
transactional script.  Private dispute resolution necessarily removes an 
element of public accountability, which may result in unfair dispute resolution 
happening with ODR.184  Furthermore, at a meta level, an improperly- or 
inexpertly-programmed dispute resolution mechanism may compound errors 
in transactional scripts: if the contract embodied in the transactional script 
performs other than as anticipated and an ODR provision is triggered, but then 
the ODR mechanism itself misfires, the aggrieved party may be doubly-
disadvantaged. 
D. Public/Private Partnership 
Some scholars propose that regulators partner with code developers to 
build information structures that only permit compliant actions, “so that 
regulation is endogenously incorporated into the decentralized ledger 
technology and the applications running on top of the technology.”185  This 
builds upon the basic premise that code defines not what parties should do, 
but what they can do—noncompliant behavior will simply not be compatible 
 
 180.   Smith & Bechtold, supra note 173, at 3.  
 181.   Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 75, at 110 (introducing the phrase “distributed jurisdiction.”).  
Schmitz & Rule, supra note 174, at 105, 122 (describing paint litigation as an absurdly out-of-touch 
resolution mechanism because it is so time-intensive and takes place offline). 
 182.   Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 75, at 109. 
 183.   Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 547 (2016). 
 184.   See Rory Van Loo, Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576562 
[https://perma.cc/D8MV-CQUT]. 
 185.   Reyes, supra note 115, at 195.  See also Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, 
RegTech and the New Era of Financial Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private-Partnership 
Models of Financial Regulators, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354, 357–59 (2018); Schrepel, supra note 17, at 
326. 
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with code, as code can only engage with compliant behavior. 
Embedding legal compliance into code that will itself execute 
transactions reduces the “law lag” between black-letter law changes and 
users’ lived experience.186  In cooperation with regulators, developers can 
update code quickly upon recognizing bugs, implementing improvements, or 
adapting to regulatory changes.187 
This “use of technological solutions to improve regulatory compliance” 
is known as “RegTech.”188  Benefits include not only reducing law lag, but 
also advances in machine learning that may allow properly developed code to 
improve itself as it runs.189  (Think what effective machine learning can do in 
a common-law system!190) 
On the other hand, machine learning and transactional script code that 
upgrades itself may make for a legal and regulatory system that evolves on its 
own, which is obviously inappropriate: the public won’t know what those 
rules are, rules could conceivably be developed differently for different 
parties, evolving laws may become discriminatory, and the public may come 
to question the very legitimacy of the framework.191 
E. Common Law 
Scholars are nearly unanimous on common law’s ability to adapt to new 
technology.192  Contract doctrine has been successfully applied to vending 
machines, shrinkwrap agreements, and other new technologies; it will work 
for transactional scripts, too.193  The biggest challenge may be making sure 
judges understand how the technology works and what it does and doesn’t 
 
 186.   See Reyes, supra note 58, at 435–36.  
 187.   See Schrepel, supra note 17, at 326. 
 188.   Yang & Tsang, supra note 185, at 357. 
 189.   Reyes, supra note 58, at 413–14. 
 190.   See id. at 428–30. 
 191.   Hassan & De Filippi, supra note 165, at 90. 
 192.   E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 16 (1995) (“traditional 
judge-made conceptions of common law are, if anything, more attuned to a complex modern world 
than to the simpler bygone age in which they were formulated.”); Raskin, supra note 11, at 306 (“there 
is little difficulty situating smart contracts within existing contract law.”); Rohr, supra note 12, at 77–
78 (“Contract law’s ability to incorporate new technology demonstrates the foundational concepts that 
do much of contract law’s heavy lifting—offer, acceptance, assent, etc.  These concepts are flexible, 
especially in the hands of common law judges . . . .  Judges who confront smart contracts will have 
similar flexibility to apply foundational contract law in different ways.”  (emphasis in original)); see 
Scholz, supra note 43, at 139, 157. 
 193.   Rohr, supra note 12, at 77, 91–92.  Technology-specific rules may develop for blockchain-
based smart contracts, as happened with shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements.  Id. at 77. 
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do.194 
Judges and juries are capable of undertaking many of the tasks that are 
likely to pose legal issues for transactional scripts, such as identifying the 
intent of contracting parties, determining whether a string of computer code 
constitutes a “writing” that will satisfy the Statute of Frauds,195 and 
determining liability for scrivener’s errors.196  For example, various U.S. 
courts have already held that emails, with their electronic signatures, 
constitute writings that satisfy the Statute of Frauds.197 
This capable common-law system, these ordinary heroes in the forms of 
judges and juries, will only be able to develop transactional script common 
law if the cases come to court, however, and that’s not always going to be 
easy.198  For example, a plaintiff who seeks a remedy from a transactional 
script gone awry must be able to identify the defendant, but a counterparty to 
a purely online transaction may not be identifiable IRL.199  The plaintiff must 
also bring suit in a court that has jurisdiction over the defendant; again, not 
always possible for purely online transactions.200  And the court must have the 
power to enforce any remedy it orders.  Consider the life insurance contract 
transactional script described above, where upon finding online confirmation 
of the insured’s death, funds are automatically released to beneficiaries.201  If 
a typo in the transactional script accidentally releases funds to a third party 
instead of the intended beneficiaries, the third party must be identified, which 
 
 194.   Id. at 92. 
 195.   See Ng, supra note 66 (“[I]n the future, litigation attorneys may no longer be litigating the 
‘four-corners’ of the contract, but rather expanding into the intent of the code.”). 
 196.   See Susan George, Smart Contracts: Tools for Transactional Lawyers, 81 TEX. B.J. 403, 
403 n.2 (2018) (“A body of law on who bears responsibility—and how much—for when a code 
malfunctions while executing a smart contract will undoubtedly develop and evolve over time.”). 
 197.   E.g., Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 295–96 (7th Cir. 2002); Central Ill. Light 
Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 916, 919 (C.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 
2003); Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Sons, Ltd., 245 F. Supp. 2d 251, 261 (D. Me. 2003); Int’l 
Casings Grp., Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874 (W.D. Mo. 2005); 
PayoutOne v. Coral Mortg. Bankers, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225–26 (D. Colo. 2009); Gillis v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d 728, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Williamson v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, 947 F. Supp. 2d 704, 710–11 (N.D. Tex. 2013); McClare v. Rocha, 86 A.3d 22, 26–27 (Me. 
2014).  But see Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1091–92 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 198.   See Spencer Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 621, 625–29 
(2019) (noting the slow evolution of contract terminology as cases are litigated and suggesting a 
technological system that can track and then predict effectiveness of contract terms). 
 199.   See McKinney et al., supra note 43, at 330. 
 200.   Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 75, at 128, 135.  For broader discussions of personal 
jurisdiction and the internet, see generally Matthew L. Perdoni, Revising the Analysis of Personal 
Jurisdiction to Accommodate Internet-Based Personal Contacts, 14 U. D.C. L. REV. 159, 162–66 
(2011); Zoe Niesel, #PersonalJurisdiction: A New Age of Internet Contacts, 94 IND. L.J. 103 (2019).  
See also, e.g., Abdouch v. Lopez, 829 N.W.2d 662, 676 (Neb. 2013). 
 201.   See supra text accompanying notes 61, 73–75. 
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may already be a difficult hurdle when utilizing a pseudonymous technology 
like distributed ledger technology.202  Once the third party can be identified, 
they must be sued in a court that can exercise personal jurisdiction over them 
as well as exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.  The third party 
may well be overseas, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  
Then, if judgment is rendered against them, the court must have some 
authority over the third party so as to enforce the judgment. 
Even assuming these obstacles can be overcome, development of 
common law in this area will be slow, and application of existing doctrine to 
new technology will have a patchwork appearance for some time.  The slow 
pace of development and consensus-building among jurisdictions may lead to 
over-emphasis on early cases.203 
V. CONCLUSION 
Transactional scripts may have great potential: efficiency, security, etc., 
but the uncertainty of their ability to perform as the parties intended—and 
uncertainty about whether any errors can be effectively unwound—is slowing 
adoption and expansion of their use.  No one enforcement mechanism seems 
perfect: statutory and regulatory responses seem inadequate, common law 
development is slow, public-private partnership lacks transparency, and 
private law places too much risk on unsophisticated parties.  Once the 
technology is defined carefully and consistently, and once it is clear what 
enforcement mechanisms are available for parties to unwind erroneous 
transactional scripts, the technology can develop more quickly and 
transactional scripts will become more prevalent and useful. 
 
 
 202.   See Schrepel, supra note 17, at 330–31 (identifying pseudonymity as a hallmark of 
blockchain and distributed ledger technology).  
 203.   E.g., Bacina, supra note 1, at 20 (engaging in significant analysis of a 2005 Singapore case, 
S M Integrated Transware Pty Ltd. v. Schenker Singapore (Pte) [2005] 2 SLR(R) 651, 654, which held 
that “although e-mails were files of binary (digital) information in their transmitted or stored form,” 
this digital information did constitute a “writing.”). 
